This paper tests the performance of 2894 hedge funds in a time period that encompasses unambiguously bullish and bearish trends whose pivot is commonly set at March 2000. The database proves to be fairly trustable with respect to the most important biases in hedge funds studies, despite the high attrition rate of funds observed in the down market. An original ten-factor composite performance model is applied that achieves very high significance levels. The analysis of performance indicates that most hedge funds significantly outperformed the market during the whole test period, mostly thanks to the bullish subperiod. In contrast, no significant underperformance of individual hedge funds strategies is observed when markets headed south. The analysis of persistence yields very similar results, with most of the predictability being found among middle performers during the bullish period. However, the 'Market Neutral' strategy represents a remarkable exception, as abnormal performance is sustained throughout and significant persistence can be found between the 20% and 69% best performers in this category, probably thanks to an extreme adaptability and a very active investment behaviour.
Introduction
Since 1990, when around 2000 hedge funds were managing together assets of ca. $60 billion, the subsequent growth of number and asset base of hedge funds has never really been refuted. The industry only suffered from a relative slowdown in 1998, but has enjoyed since then a renewed vitality with an estimated size of 8400 funds managing $900 billion assets in (Van Hedge Funds Advisors International, 2002 , corresponding to growth rates of respectively 10.8% and 21.3% respectively.
The growing trend of the sector could be remarkably sustained during the stock market collapse that started in March 2000, when the NASDAQ Composite Index reached an all-time high of 5132, and finished three years later with a floor level at 1253. In the meantime, the global net asset value (NAV) of hedge funds continued to grow at a steady 10.6% (Van Hedge Funds Advisors International, 2002) , contrasting with a decrease of 2.7% in worldwide mutual fund industry (Investment Company Institute, 2003) .
This relatively positive attitude of investors is typically motivated by the perceptions that hedge funds are largely market neutral, that their managers enjoy greater flexibility in their asset allocation that enables them to achieve a better market timing (Fung and Hsieh, 1997) , or that hedge funds have a relatively low covariance with other classes of financial assets, making them a good diversification vehicle (Schneeweis and Spurgin, 1998; Capocci and Hiibner, 2001; Kat and Amin, 2003) .
The vast majority of performance studies on hedge funds has not focused on their behaviour under different market conditions. This is generally due to the particularly bullish period corresponding to the time window under review, as most empirical evidence reveals that data collected prior to 1994 by several data vendors displays a significant survivorship bias, as shown by Fung and Hsieh (2000) , Liang (2000) and Capocci and Hiibner (2004) .
In this context, Ackermann et al. (1999) and Liang (1999) find that hedge funds constantly obtain better performance than mutual funds, although lower and more volatile than the reference market indices considered.
On the other hand, the issue of persistence in performance is particularly important in the case of hedge funds because these funds experience a greater attrition rate than mutual funds (Brown et al, 1999 (Brown et al, , 2001 Liang, 1999) . Agarwal and Naik (2000) find evidence of persistence in hedge funds performance, while Capocci and Hiibner (2004) sustain that it can be mostly found among average performers and Brown et al. (1999) conclude that there is hardly any evidence of the existence of differential manager skills but persistence is rather due to style effects.
Few authors have attempted to estimate the behaviour of hedge funds in bear markets. The periods under study do not favour this exercise, as periods of downward trends on the stock market were rare and discontinuous. For the period 1990-1998, Edwards and Caglayan (2001) find that only three hedge fund strategies (Market Neutral, Event Driven and Macro) provide protection to investors when stock markets head south. More recently, Ennis and Sebastian (2003) contend that in general, hedge funds did not provide investor protection after the market downturn of March 2000; rather, their superior performance is mostly due to the good market timing of their managers during the US stock market bubble that preceded it.
This study benefits from the fact that stock markets have experienced a long period of depression, since stock indices had been almost continuously going down for a period of three years after March 2000. Thus, our analysis neither suffers from discontinuities between down periods, that preclude any analysis of persistence, nor from arbitrarily chosen definitions of a bear market, as Fabozzi and Francis (1979) , Kao et al (1998) , Rao (2001) , Edwards and Caglayan (2001) and Liang (2003) .
In this paper, using a similar methodology as the one developed by Capocci and Hiibner (2004) , we study the performance of hedge funds and its persistence during a time window that encompasses relatively long bullish and bearish periods. This paper introduces several key modifications with respect to the previous studies on hedge funds performance and persistence. Firstly, although Capocci and Hiibner (2004) and Liang (2001) consider a relatively short bearish subperiod with the Asian crisis, their sample does not enable them to distinguish between unambiguously bullish and bearish subperiods. Our study will thus identify and separately analyse two subperiods corresponding to upward and downward market trends, with a pivot set at the end of March 2000.
Secondly, we introduce a modified asset pricing model encompassing the risk premia that proved to be relevant for assessing funds performance in previous studies, successively proposed by Fama and French (1993) , Carhart (1997) , Agarwal and Naik (2004) and Capocci and Hiibner (2004) . This yields a model with 10 risk premia, which may look at first sight overspecified but one has to bear in mind that hedge funds families are very heterogeneous and, unlike mutual funds, involve investments in many types of assets and markets.
Thirdly, we specifically identify one hedge fund strategy, namely Market Neutral that, following the results of Edwards and Caglayan (2001) , supposedly hedges investors against bearish markets. It has also been studied in an unambiguously bullish setup by Capocci and Hiibner (2004) , who find that this family of funds tends to outperform the market during the 1994-2000 period. In this paper, we perform an in-depth analysis of the level and persistence of its performance before and after the stock markets downturn.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the performance models we will use. In Section 3, we provide a thorough analysis of the database. The fourth section studies potential biases in the database. The next section reports the performance of hedge funds for the whole period and the subperiods considered. Section 6 documents and explains the persistence in hedge fund returns over the same time windows, with a special focus on the Market Neutral strategy. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Performance Measurement Models
The starting point of our study of hedge funds performance is the original Sharpe (1964 )-Lintner (1965 CAPM. As the basic multi-factor specification, we use the Carhart (1997) model as it is widely used in practice and it is not dominated by any other model in the mutual funds performance literature. Finally, we construct a multifactor model that extends the Carhart (1997) specification by combining it with factors proposed in Agarwal and Naik (2004) and Capocci and Hiibner (2004) and by adding an additional factor.
The Capital Asset Pricing model
The first performance model we use is a single index model based on the classical CAPM developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) . Its equation to estimate is the following:
(1) where R Pt = return of fund P in month t; R Ft = risk-free return on month t; R Mt = return of the market portfolio on month t; ε Pt = error term; α P and β P are the intercept and the slope of the regression, respectively.
The intercept of this equation, α p commonly called Jensen's alpha (1968) is usually interpreted as a measure of out-or under-performance relative to the market proxy used.
2.2 The 4-factor Model of Carhart (1997) The four-factor model of Carhart (1997) is an extension of the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. It takes into account size and book-to-market ratio, but also an additional factor for the momentum effect. Grinblatt et al. (1995) define this effect as buying stocks that were past winners and selling past losers. This model is estimated with the following regression:
where SMB t = the factor-mimicking portfolio for size ('small minus big'), HML t = the factor-mimicking portfolio for book-to-market equity ('high minus low') 1 and PR1YR t = the factor-mimicking portfolio for the momentum effect.
2 These factors aim at isolating the firm-specific components of returns.
The Composite Model
In order to take into account the complex characteristics of the hedge fund industry, we implement a combination and an extension of Carhart's (1997) four-factor model, the model used by Agarwal and Naik (2004) and the one used by Capocci and Hiibner (2004) . This model contains the market risk premium, Fama and French (1993) 'size' and 'value' factors, Carhart's (1997) 'momentum' factor, five factors introduced by Agarwal and Naik (2004) : a factor for non-US equities investing funds (MSCI World excluding US), two factors to account for the fact that hedge funds invest in US and foreign bond indices 3 (Lehman High Yield Bond Index and Salomon World Government Bond Index) and one factor that Capocci and Hiibner (2004) proved to be highly significant, the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index, and finally a commodity factor (GSCI Commodity Index). Furthermore, we add an additional bond index factor that is not used in previous studies, namely the Lehman Mortgage-Backed Securities Index to take into account the fact that various hedge funds strategies (fixed income arbitrage, mortgage-backed securities) are exposed to this market, and the Lehman High-Yield Credit Bond Index.
The market proxy used is the value-weighted portfolio of all NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq stocks market proxy that is usually used in mutual funds performance studies.
Several additional factors, such as the MSCI Emerging Markets Index, the Lehman BAA Corporate Bond Index and the Salomon Brothers Government and Corporate Bond Index proposed by Agarwal and Naik (2004) and Capocci and Hiibner (2004) and the Gold index used by Fung and Hsieh (1997) were not included in our extended model given their high colinearity with our set of indices.
(3)
where R Mt = return on the Russel 3000 Index; MSWXUS t = return of the MSCI World Index excluding US; SWGBI t = return of the Salomon World Government Bond Index; JPMEMBI t = return of the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index; HY t = return of the Lehman High Yield Credit Bond Index; MORT t = return of the Lehman Mortgage-Backed Securities Index; and GSCI t = return of the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index.
Data

Database
Three main hedge fund databases are available for empirical studies: 'Managed Account Reports' (MAR), 'Hedge Fund Research, Inc.' (HFR), and 'TASS Management' (TASS) . These databases are the most used in academic and commercial hedge fund studies.
5 Data vendors do not only collect performance data. For a majority of funds, they record other useful information such as company name, start and ending date, strategy followed, assets under management, management and incentive fees, manager's name etc. There is no consensus on the definition of the strategy followed but there are similarities. MAR defines nine strategies with a total of 16 substrategies. HFR defines 16 different strategies in two categories, 12 non-directional and five directional strategies, plus the Funds of Funds and the Sector categories. Finally, TASS defines 15 strategies.
We use hedge fund data from MAR, as in Fung and Hsieh (1997) , Schneeweis and Spurgin (1998) , and Amin and Kat (2003) . The database gives monthly net-of-fee individual returns and other information on individual funds and groups them in indices. We use 108 monthly returns on 2894 individual hedge funds plus 48 indices (16 investment styles with 3 indices for each investment style: onshore, offshore and a combined index). These funds include 1622 funds alive at the end of the period (56%) and 1272 dissolved funds (44%).
Hedge funds are classified in two categories. The Individual Funds category features 13 strategies: Event driven -Risk Arbitrage, Event-Driven -Distressed Securities, Global, Global Est., Global Intern., Global Emerging, US Opp., 6 Macro, Market Neutral, Long Only Leveraged, Sector, Short Sales and No Category, the latter one corresponding to funds with no stated strategy and funds whose strategy does not fill in any of the above. The Funds of Funds category features 3 strategies: Niche, Diversified and Others.
We take the value-weighted portfolio of all NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq stocks market proxy that is usually used in mutual funds performance studies French, 1993, 1996; Carhart, 1997) . Its almost perfectly correlation with the Russell 3000 index used in Agarwal and Naik (2004) suggests that both market proxies are very similar.
7 Finally, the one-month T-bill rate from Ibbotson Associates is taken as the risk-free rate.
Basic Performance
Panel A of Table 1a contains descriptive statistics of the funds, whether living or dead, in our database. These hedge funds data are contrasted against the descriptive statistics of the factors introduced in equation (3) of Section 2. These statistics are reported in panel B of Table lb .
Panel A shows that the highest mean return was achieved by the Sector (1.66%), then the Global Est. (1.29%) and Global Emerging (1.17%) follow. Average returns of Funds of Funds are all around 0.70%, only followed by the Global (0.45%) strategy that achieves the lowest mean return. This pattern is similar for the mean excess returns. These descriptive statistics differ from the results obtained by Capocci and Hiibner (2004) for the 1994-2000 period, who find that the best performers are US Opportunistics Small Caps, US Opportunistics Growth and Sector while the worst average performers are Foreign Exchange, Short Sales and the Funds of Funds, without substrategy. This difference can be explained by the difference in the database used (MAR combined with HFR for Capocci and Hiibner, 2004) and the different time period studied.
The Sharpe measure (the ratio of excess return and standard deviation) offers a much different picture: accounting for risk, Market Neutral funds appear to be the best performers, while the funds that achieve the highest absolute returns are only among the average risk-adjusted performers.
A look at the t-stats indicates that mean returns are significantly different from 0 at the 5% significance level for all funds and that the mean excess returns are significantly positive for all cases but the Global and Diversified funds of funds categories.
Panel B of Table 1 a shows that the mean excess return of the Market Proxy is 0.78% per month (about 9.5% per year), only statistically different from zero at the 10% level. This reasonable value indicates that the bullish subperiod has been almost totally offset by the market correction. 
Analysis per Subperiods
The cutting point chosen for the identification of the up and down periods has been set at March 2000. This month corresponds to the maximum observed value of the Russell 3000 Index that reached a value of 858.48 during the session of 24 March 2000. During the up period, the monthly index return was positive in 70% of the months (52 out of 74) with an average yearly return of 19.4%. During the down period, the monthly index return was positive in 39% of the months (12 out of 34) and the average yearly return was -16.9%. Those trends are sufficiently strong to allow us to consider both subperiods as, respectively, bullish and bearish without having to use a complex rule to separate bullish, bearish and neutral months since these rules would probably not match the ones used by funds managers for their market timing decisions.
The analysis of basic performance for the two subperiods under study, presented in Table 2 , reveals some interesting differences. Table 2 displays summary results for the bullish and bearish subperiods. As expected from the nature of the time windows, excess returns obtained for the majority of hedge funds strategies are mostly due to the bullish subperiod, with the best performers before March 2000 also displaying the worst returns after the market reversal took place. There are three noticeable exceptions. Firstly, the US Opportunistics strategy does poorly in spite of favourable market conditions, which explains the disappearance of this category. Secondly, the Global strategy seems to achieve returns that are much less dependent on the conjuncture than the other strategies. Finally, the Short Sales strategy is the only one that records significant excess returns during bad times but at the expense of insignificant returns in good times.
Preliminary evidence does not seem to indicate that the behaviour of the two Event Driven and of the Macro strategies outperform the other ones in the bearish period, while the returns of the Market Neutral strategy are then significant but not when excess returns are considered. Although further evidence is obviously needed, this does not support the findings of Edwards and Caglayan (2001) with a different definition of bearish market conditions.
For our factors, the same analysis shows that the Market and Momentum factors give the highest excess returns during the first subperiod, while the Book-to-Market and Lehman Mortgage factors obtain significant positive abnormal returns during the second one. Poorest performers are the Lehman Aggregate US Bond Index during the up market trend period and the Market and World Excluding US factors during the down period. 
Correlations
The traditional hedge funds literature contends that, thanks to their weak correlation between hedge funds and other securities, hedge funds are likely to improve to the risk-return trade-off when added to a traditional portfolio (Fung and Hsieh, 1997; Schneeweis and Spurgin, 1998; Liang, 1999; Amin and Kat, 2003) . This subsection studies the ranges of correlation coefficients among and between hedge funds and passive investment strategies. The correlations have been computed for the whole 1994-2002 period and for two subperiods. In order to obtain periods with comparable lengths, we took the bearish subperiod starting in April 2000 (33 months) and matched it against the most bullish time window, that started in September 1998 (19 months) rather than the whole 1994-03:2000 period. Because of the extremely large number of results to be reported, we chose to report ranges in correlations. Results are reported in Table 3a -c.
In each cell, correlations increase as the color is darker. The upper part of the cell accounts for the correlation during the whole period, while the lower part is split between the pre-and post-March 2000 subperiods.
Panel A reports correlations among hedge funds strategies. As typically reported (Liang, 2003; Capocci and Hübner, 2004) in the literature, these strategies are in general highly correlated when indices are considered, with the exception of the Short Sales strategy that systematically goes conversely -as expected. However, a closer look at their evolution over time indicates that the Global and, to a lesser extent, the Global International strategies tend to decrease their correlation with other funds in bearish times; on the other hand, the Global This table shows the number of funds following a particular strategy (or substrategy), the corresponding number of living and dead funds, mean returns, mean excess returns, and Sharpe ratios for the individual hedge funds in our MAR database for the subperiods 01:1994-03:2000 (bullish) and 04:2000-12:2002 (bearish) . Sharpe ratio is the ratio of excess return and standard deviation with a risk-free rate set at 5%.
Emerging strategy follows the other strategies more closely during periods of down markets. The No Category and Niche strategies seem to be more correlated with the rest of hedge funds in the subperiods than in the full period. In Panel B, the behaviour of our explanatory variables is also of considerable interest. Only four indices (Market, World Excluding US, SMB and Lehman High Yield) have a high correlation with most hedge funds strategies. These results confirm that hedge funds strategies are weakly correlated with most traditional investment tools.
The first line indicates that almost all hedge funds strategies tend to follow the market (US and international) more closely in the bearish subperiod. This strong tendency is not invalidated for the supposedly investorprotecting strategies. In general, hedge funds strategies sharply decrease and even reverse their loading with the momentum factor, as they become momentum-contrarian during bad times. They also reduce their sensitivity towards the Emerging Market Bond factor, while increasing their exposure to the Lehman High Yield and the SMB factors. The Short Sales strategy, for its part, noticeably switches from a 'Glamour' strategy (low loading with the HML factor) to a 'Value' one in the last subperiod. This is the only strategy that consistently invests in Value stocks in bearish markets.
Panel C indicates that the correlation coefficients of our regressors are low enough to raise serious multicolinearity concerns. 
Analysis of Biases
Survivorship Bias
In order to reduce the severity of survivorship bias, an important concern for mutual funds (Carhart, 1997) as well as hedge funds studies (Ackermann et al., 1999; Fung and Hsieh, 2000) , data vendors backfill each fund's performance history prior to their addition to the database. Thus, they provide data that go back before the starting date of the database itself, usually 1993. However, before this starting date, one is left with only surviving funds data. Brown et al. (2001) , for the TASS database, and Capocci and Hiibner (2004) for the combined MAR and HFR databases have shown that data for the pre-1994 period is indeed subject to nonnegligible survivorship bias that is very likely to hinder statistical inference (Hendricks et al, 1993) . Data starting in 1994 appears to be more reliable according to this criterion (Capocci and Hiibner, 2004) .
Two definitions of this bias are commonly used in mutual and hedge fund studies: the performance difference between surviving and dissolved funds (Ackermann et al, 1999) and the performance difference between living and all funds (Liang, 2000) .
We report the bias using both definitions for the whole period and for two subperiods 1994-03: 2000 and 04:2000-2002 .
In Panel A of Table 4a , we report the yearly returns of all funds, surviving funds and dissolved funds. Hedge funds experience extremely high returns in 1999, when the stock market experienced a sharp positive return, without great difference between surviving and dissolved funds. In the subsequent years, returns gradually reduced but mostly due to the negative returns of dissolved funds. This is a clear effect of the bearish turn of the market after March 2000, leading to an increase in differences in hedge funds returns between the best and the worst performing managers. In Panel B, our results yield a monthly survivorship bias of 0.41% (or 4.92% per annum) for the whole period using the first formula while in Panel C the bias of 0.13% per month (1.51% per annum) with the second formula. This latter value is much higher than the very low value obtained by Ackermann et al. for the period 1988 Ackermann et al. for the period -1995 It is similar to the percentage of 1.5% from Fung and Hsieh (1998) , lower than the 0.30% monthly bias found by Fung and Hsieh (2000) and slightly higher than the percentage of 1.2% found by Capocci and Hübner (2004) for the 1994-2000 period. It is however lower than the 3% bias found by Liang (2001) , which is also the industry consensus as stressed by Amin and Kat (2003) .
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A look at subperiod biases indicates that the level of this bias is mostly due to the bearish period, where its level sets at 2.61%. The bias drifts up through the very high level of returns differential between surviving and dissolved funds, but this effect is somehow mitigated by the decrease in the proportion of returns from dissolved funds in the database (this proportion steadily decreases from 35.9% in 1999 to 9.1% in 2002). Thanks to this bias-reduction effect of recent data, the global behaviour of the database in relationship to survivorship bias is kept within reasonable bounds.
Instant Return History Bias
As hedge funds are not allowed to advertise, their managers consider inclusion in a database primarily as a marketing tool. This creates a positive instant history bias or backfilled bias (Fung and Hsieh, 2000) that occurs because a fund's performance history is backfilled after inclusion. The upward bias results from the likelihood that funds with a poor track record are less likely to apply for inclusion than funds with good performance history.
We use the same two-step methodology as Park (1995) , Brown et al. (2001) , and Fung and Hsieh (2000) to estimate this bias for our hedge fund database. On the one hand, we estimate the average monthly return of the 'observable portfolio' which invests in all funds from our database each month. On the other hand, we estimate the average monthly return of the 'adjusted observable portfolio' obtained from investing in all these funds after deleting the first 12,24 and, if possible, 36, 48 and 60 months of returns. The bias is estimated for the whole period and for the bullish and bearish subperiods in order to compare our results with those obtained by Fung and Hsieh (2000) and Capocci and Hiibner (2004) . Results are reported in Table 5 .
For the whole period, the observable monthly return averaged 0.99%, while the adjusted observable one was 0.88% (when deleting the 12 first months), 0.84% (24 months), 0.81% (36 and 48 months), and 0.80% (60 months). This gives an estimate of 1.32% per year, very much in line with the values of 1.4% found by Fung and Hsieh (2000) and 1.2% found by Capocci and Hiibner (2004) .
Contrarily to the analysis of the survivorship bias, the first subperiod is mostly responsible for the level of the bias. Because the period was increasingly bullish, with the highest returns being obtained around the end of the period, the bias starts at a fairly high level and increases as more returns are removed from the estimation, consistently with the phenomenon found by Capocci and Hübner (2004) . For the 'bearish' subperiod, only partial results are available due to the small length of this period, but the bias is kept at very reasonable levels. Instant history bias is calculated as the performance difference between the average monthly return using the portfolio which invests in all funds each month (the observable portfolio) and the average monthly return from investing in these funds after deleting the first 12, 24, 36 and 60 months of returns (the adjusted observable portfolio). All returns are net of fees and on a monthly basis unless otherwise indicated.
One may relate the level of this bias to the one of survivorship bias in this context: during unfavourable market conditions, there is a sharp difference in the returns between surviving and dissolved funds that can be explained by attrition of the latter funds because of their bad performance. As only the most successful funds tend to remain during this time period, the corresponding instant history bias is likely to be mitigated by this selfselection of the most successful managers towards the end of the period, while the observable portfolio returns include returns from subsequently dissolved funds.
Conclusions
Overall, this examination of biases indicates that both survivorship and instant history biases are kept to very reasonable levels for the whole period as well as for the bullish and bearish subperiods, but for very different reasons. Interestingly, survivorship bias is higher for the period of down market, while there is evidence of a more important instant history bias during the upward trending period.
One could have suspected that the high failure rate of hedge funds after March 2000 would have lead survivorship bias to suspiciously high levels, but this is avoided by the particular behaviour of the database, and especially thanks to the increase in the number of funds that has been observed over the same time window. Yet, the phenomenon of elimination of the poorest performers under unfavourable market conditions is also responsible for the remarkably low level of the instant history bias.
Hedge Funds Performance
This section aims at studying whether hedge funds, as a whole or strategy by strategy, have significantly outperformed the market. We compute all estimations by using Newey-West standard errors to adjust for any autocorrelation in the returns. Table 6 reports the results for Individual Funds and Funds of Funds, and all funds strategies, with equally weighted portfolio excess returns for each investment style. The model is also estimated for each fund individually. 10 To analyse hedge funds performance in more details, the last columns give the distribution of individually estimated alphas per strategy, with the percentage of significantly positive, insignificant and negative alphas at the 5% level. Panel A of Table 6a , b reports performance estimates using the CAPM. The estimated betas are rather low, except for the Long Only Leveraged, and all R-squared are below 60%, except for Long Only Leveraged and Global Est., suggesting the need to use a more detailed model. Overall, two-thirds of the individual funds strategies produce significantly positive alphas, while the two Funds of Funds strategies outperform the market at the 10% level. Overall, hedge funds as a whole also significantly outperform the market at the 1 % level. Taken individually, 32% of the alphas are significantly positive.
Performance Measurement using the CAPM
Performance Measurement Using Multi-factor Models
It is presumably better to use a multi-factor model to account for all possible investment strategies. In Panel B of Table 6a , b, we report the results for Carhart's 4-factor model and in Panel C the results for our combined model applied to hedge funds.
Panel B reveals that the premium on the SMB factor is, in almost all cases, significant, including in the Short Sales strategy where it is negative. The coefficients of the HML and Momentum factors are significant for four and six individual funds strategies, respectively, and to all funds of funds strategies.
Panel C shows that the explanatory power of the HML factor seems marginal as only three betas are significantly positive at the 5% level. The Momentum factor remains a stronger indicator of hedge funds behaviour, with only the Short Sales strategy being momentum-contrarian over the whole period. The results with our combined model also indicate that all additional factors add explanatory power to the regression. In particular, as already outlined by Capocci and Hübner (2004) , the Emerging Bond factor adds explanatory power in more than 50% of the strategies with high significance levels. Event Driven strategies are more prone to bear a high exposure to high yield bond factors, while Global International and Emerging strategies share similar risk exposure characteristics except that the former is more momentum-driven and the latter is naturally heavily exposed to the Emerging Market Bond factor. The last column gives the distribution of individually estimated monthly alphas for all funds with 24 monthly data or more in a specific investment style. Results for the US Opportunistics and Other categories are not reported as they have, respectively, 0 and 1 living fund in the second subperiod. We report the percentage of significantly positive alphas (+), significantly negative alphas (-) and alphas insignificantly different from zero (0) at the 5% level, t-stats are heteroscdasticity consistent. ***Significant at the 1% level, "significant at the 5% level and *significant at the 10% level.
Evidence on alphas obtained in Panel C is not favourable to Funds of Funds and to the Macro strategy. Overall, accounting for more risk premia reduces the average reported out-performance by 0.1 % per month. The individual alpha distribution shows that taking more factors into account drives down that the proportion of individual funds and funds of funds that significantly out-performed the market, and the distribution of performance among strategies is also more concentrated.
Overall it seems that the combined model does a very good job in describing hedge funds behaviour. The average R² adj increases from 0.61 for the single factor model, to 0.80 for the four-factor model and to 0.84 for our combined model. This coefficient is the best one reported in the literature so far.
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Performance Over Bullish and Bearish Subperiods
In order to analyse the performance components in the bullish and bearish market configurations, we only report results for our combined model. Table 7a A quick look at the alphas for the considered subperiod clearly indicates that the major part of the performance over the total 1994-2002 period is recorded prior March 2000, with the noticeable exception of the Market Neutral strategy that sustains positive out-performance for both subperiods. This finding is consistent with the result obtained by Liang (2003) who investigates the behaviour of hedge funds strategies using a piecewise linear regression setup: Market Neutral funds obtain by far the largest standardized value for alpha, with at the same time a very low explanatory power of the regression.
In contrast, Panel A shows that the Global strategy achieves significant negative performance during the bullish period. It is worth reporting that, although nine individual strategies and both funds of funds strategies record a negative alpha in Panel B, none of these values are shown to be significant. A look at individual alphas reinforces this finding, as the proportion of significantly positive alphas does not significantly differ from the total period to the first subperiod, but Panel B shows that 27% of the Market Neutral funds sustain positive outperformance while on average more than 80% of individual funds managers are in line with the market.
The strategies followed by funds managers sharply differ from one subperiod to another. Some general swings of exposures to several risk factors are observed from one period to another Exposure to the World excluding US usually becomes negative, although with low significance levels, in the bearish subperiod, except for Global International and Short Sales. On the other, the broadly negative exposure to the World Government Bond Index in the first subperiod fades away after March 2000 except for Global and Sector, although the Short Sales strategy follows a converse tendency. The loadings for the Emerging Market Bond Index and High Yield Bond Index are generally positive in the first and second subperiod, respectively, which possibly indicates a broad sliding of bond strategies of hedge funds managers.
At the individual strategy level, some changes are also of particular interest after March 2000. Event driven strategies cease to be momentum-contrarian. All Global strategies increase their investments in small firms and reduce their exposures to bond factors; this latter statement also holds for Macro funds. Market Neutral funds managers relied more extensively on domestic bond indices. Strikingly, the Short Sales strategy left a pure market-contrarian profile for a much broader mix of exposures (positive for HML, World excluding US and Commodity Index; negative for SMB, Momentum and World Government Bond Index).
For Funds of Funds strategies, the noticeable difference is the noticeable reinforcement of the loadings to the Momentum factor and the High Yield Bond Index after March 2000, while the exposure to the World Government Bond Index goes from very negative to slightly positive. The last column gives the distribution of individually estimated monthly alphas for all funds with 24 monthly data or more in a specific investment style. In Panel B, results for the US Opportunistics and Other categories are not reported as they have, respectively, 0 and 1 living fund in the second subperiod. We report the percentage of significantly positive alphas (+), significantly negative alphas (-) and alphas insignificantly different from zero (0) at the 5% level, (-stats are heteroscedasticity consistent. ***Significant at the 1% level, "significant at the 5% level and *significant at the 10% level.
Persistence in Performance
Our results show significant evidence of superior performance over the total period of time for most individual strategies. Nevertheless, results are mostly due to the first, bullish subperiod and the positive out-performance tends to fade away after March 2000. Nevertheless, active hedge funds selection strategies are likely to increase the expected return if performance is persistent, i.e. if a superior average return in a period is likely to be followed by a superior average return in the next period for a given fund. Sirri and Tufano (1998) document large inflows of money into last years best performers, and withdrawals from last years' losers. Zheng (1999) finds that newly invested money in these best performing mutual funds is a predictor of future performance. This indicates that persistence in performance is critical for mutual funds.
This is all the more important given that we have found in the previous subsection a substantial break in performance at the peak of the stock markets. Is persistence sustainable over the total period, or is it likely to be observed only in a particular subperiod?
Persistence Over the Total Period
We follow the methodology of Carhart (1997) using our combined model. All funds are ranked based on their previous year total return. Every January, we put all funds into 10 equally weighted portfolios, ordered from highest to lowest past returns. Portfolios 1 (High) and 10 (Low) are then further subdivided on the same measure. The portfolios are held till the following January and then rebalanced again. Funds that disappear during the course of the year are included in the equally-weighted average until their death, then portfolio weights are readjusted appropriately. This yields a time series of monthly returns on each decile portfolio from 01:1995 to 12:2002 (Table 8 ).
The monthly average return to the strategy of investing in portfolios 1 and 10 would have been, respectively, 1.07% and 0.44% for the total period.
The monthly excess returns on the decile portfolios decrease monotonically between portfolio D1 and D8, but the subdecile D10c obtains an excess return higher than 1%, slightly significant. The spreads between decile excess returns are not significant. Cross-sectional variation in returns is considerably larger for the extreme deciles than for the middle deciles, in line with the results of Brown et al. (2001) and Capocci and Hübner (2004) .
After controlling for the risk factors, the picture is dramatically altered. The D10c portfolio, i.e. the extreme losers, enjoy a remarkable monthly out-performance of 1.77%. 12 The 1a-10c spread goes from an insignificant 0.05% to a significant -1.6%. Aside from this extreme value, significant alphas are mostly to be found in the middle deciles, with the most significant values (at 1% level) being observed in portfolios D4 to D8.
The pattern of loading to risk premia suggests that past winners more closely follow the market, invest more in small firms and in emerging bond markets but less in the world stock index than past losers. Quite naturally given the definition of the portfolios, past winners follow momentum strategies while past losers are momentumcontrarian.
In the middle deciles, where performance seems to be persistent when accounting for risk, we notice that these strategies are usually characterized by positive exposure to the HML factor (value strategy), negative exposure to the world bond index but positive exposure to the emerging bond markets, indicating arbitraging strategies on geographical bond markets. This is a possible source for their sustained performance.
Persistence Over the Subperiods
The same analysis as before is performed in Table 9a , b for the bullish (Panel A) and for the bearish (Panel B) subperiods.
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Panel A of Table 9 displays, not surprisingly, very comparable results with the ones of Table 8 , but there are some important differences. First, the alpha for portfolio D10c is not significant anymore; only middle-decile portfolios have a significant alpha. This result is consistent with Capocci and Hiibner (2004) that analyse the 01:1994-06:2000 period. There is no significant spread between decile portfolio returns.
Loading to individual factors are to a large extent similar for stock indices, but not at all for bond indices. During the bullish period, past winners have not invested in any bond index, and even heavily divested from the world bond index. In contrast, they have also significant loadings with respect to the commodity index. At the same time, past average performers were mostly invested in the high yield bond market.
Unfortunately, Panel B indicates that there is no evidence of persistence in good performance during the bearish period. The only sustained performance is the negative one, as past losers are found to persistently aggravate their losses in portfolios D10, D10a and D10b. This finding is in line with our analysis of survivorship biases, reinforcing the conjecture that there was a particularly high mortality rate after March 2000 due to poor performance of the disappeared funds.
Top decile portfolios during that period had positive loadings in high yield bonds and in the Momentum factor, but negative loadings in the commodity market and the HML factor. The losing strategies, i.e. the ones persistently followed by bottom decile portfolios, had loading of opposite signs on the same factors and, additionally, very high loadings on the mortgage market.
We also notice that, contrarily to the 'conventional wisdom' concerning the correlation between the momentum factor and hedge funds performance during bearish periods, past winners consistently invested in momentum strategies and past winners consistently followed contrarian strategies after March 2000. The paradox is only illusory, as past winners typically hold winner stocks in their portfolio and are thus naturally positively exposed to the momentum factor with these securities. Our results simply suggest that these funds managers did not actively manage this particular component of their portfolio.
Analysis of the Market Neutral Strategy
This subsection focuses on the persistence in returns for the only hedge funds strategy that has been found to provide significant abnormal returns for both subperiods in the previous section, namely the Market Neutral strategy. We determine whether persistence in returns exists for this strategy for the whole period as well as for the subperiods. As for the total sample, we classify funds in 10 decile portfolios, with the top and bottom decile divided in 3. Table 10a -c reports our results for these strategies.
Panel A reports the results of the analysis for the global period. They show that there is no significant difference between good and bad performing funds. All alphas but the one of portfolio D10c are significantly positive for the whole period, although the significance level is lower for the extreme subdeciles. Compared to our results for the whole database, excess returns are higher for the extreme deciles and smaller for middle deciles; however, returns of Market Neutral funds exhibit a much lower variance, and higher alphas for the top deciles (from D1 to D5). In a nutshell, all but the poorest past performers exhibit a significant persistence in performance. The review of risk coefficients shows that, aside from the fact that past best performers had a significant loading on the stock market index and on the SMB factor while past losers had a greater focus on world stock markets, no other clear pattern emerges. Panels B and C display very different pictures. During the 1994-March 2000 period, only the alphas of top decile funds were systematically higher than for the whole period. In contrast, the lowest decile funds did not outperform the market. Middle decile funds had a clearer focus on high yield bond markets.
Panel C shows that the persistence in performance during the market collapse was clearly sustained for portfolios D2 to D6, with high significance levels. These funds had no particularly remarkable investment pattern, except for the median decile (D4) whose loadings are significant for the High Yield factor (positive) and for the World Government Bond and Momentum factors (negative), with a relatively high adjusted R 2 of 57.8%.
Since these decile portfolios had significant alphas for the first subperiod too, this indicates that the superior performance of these funds was predictable irrespective of the prevailing market conditions. We view this as a major result considering that Market Neutral funds have traditionally been assigned the role of protecting investors against negative market twists: this reinforces this claims on a double dimension, as our results suggest that this performance is not only sustained during positive or negative market conditions, but during both; however, persistence in performance is observable for the medium-to-top past performers only, showing that only a very targeted investment behaviour in Market Neutral funds would provide a sustained positive abnormal return. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the poor adjustment of the model for the best performing decile portfolios during the down market period also signals that these fund managers tended to pursue very active and moving investment strategies, placing great importance on market timing and tactical allocation. The alternative explanation of missing risk factors, which is also reported in Liang (2003) , although theoretically possible, is not very compelling given the proven very high accuracy of our combined model. However, this particular aspect opens the way to additional research on hedge funds performance and persistence during unfavourable market conditions.
Conclusions
The evolution of financial markets during the 1994-2002 period has been very rich in significant up and down market movements whose length and severity have been largely unprecedented. In this paper, we have seized this opportunity to test whether hedge funds displayed significantly different patterns of performance levels and persistence during this time window as well as in undoubtedly bullish and bearish market situations.
First, our database constituted of 2894 funds obtained fromMAR proved to be fairly trustworthy with respect to the most important biases in hedge funds studies, namely the survivorship and instant return history biases despite the high attrition rate of funds observed after March 2000. Our original ten-factor composite performance model also raises little suspicion concerning its ability to explain returns as we achieve very high significance levels with very little correlation among regressors.
The analysis of performance indicates that most hedge funds significantly out-performed the market during the whole test period, but this is mostly due to the bullish subperiod. The pattern is somehow attenuated for funds of funds strategies. In contrast, no significant underperformance of individual hedge funds of funds of funds strategies is observed when markets headed south. The Market Neutral strategy provides a noticeable exception, however, as is sustains abnormal performance over both the bullish and the bearish subperiods.
Persistence analysis also indicates that most of the predictability of superior performance is to be found prior to March 2000. Our results confirm several previous studies that found that persistence, if any, is mostly located among medium performers. In the second subperiod, only negative persistence can be found among the past losers, suggesting that bad performance has probably been the decisive factor for hedge funds mortality.
Our analysis of the performance of the Market Neutral strategy is remarkably encouraging and is confirmed and refined with the persistence analysis: for portfolios that were between the 20% and 69% best performers in this category, abnormal performance and persistence are pervasive throughout the subperiods, probably thanks to an extreme adaptability and a very active investment behaviour.
Obviously, these very appealing results call for a much more detailed analysis of the Market Neutral strategy among individual hedge funds. Market timing issues do matter for their risk exposure, and traditional asset pricing models may not fully account for their highly unstable investment strategies. We believe that this paper potentially opens the way to a deeper examination of the properties of these particular hedge funds during negative market conditions, but this particular field of investigation is left for future theoretical as well as empirical research.
